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ABSTRACT 
MILTON PICKLESIMER: Transitive Inference and The Testing Effect:  The Effects of 
Testing on Knowledge Structure Formation 
(Under the direction of Neil W. Mulligan) 
 
 
 Compared to restudying, testing has often been found to enhance memory.  This 
is called the testing effect.  However, the causes of this effect are not entirely understood. 
Testing could merely enhance isolated stimulus-response associations (i.e., item memory) 
or also enhance the unifying structure of the memoranda (i.e., relational memory).  
Recent studies have examined these issues with mixed results.  The current study 
employed a transitive inference paradigm to teach participants a novel, highly inter-
related knowledge structure comprised of several basic premises.  Encoding strategy was 
manipulated between subjects.  Both groups took a final test that assessed memory for the 
basic premises and their ability to make transitive inferences about them.  Experiment 1 
found no differences between the groups.  After using a stronger manipulation in 
Experiment 2, it was found that, for participants who indicated awareness of the 
hierarchical structure of the materials, there were no differences between encoding 
conditions.  For unaware participants, however, the restudying group showed superior 
performance on transitive inference problems.  Thus, the current study identified 
conditions under which testing does not enhance inferential ability or memory for the 
unifying structure of the memoranda. 
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The Testing Effect 
 Educators and memory researchers frequently employ tests as a form of learning 
assessment to see how much of the imparted knowledge has been retained by their pupils 
or subjects.  Much to their surprise, researchers have found that tests can also be a form 
of learning enhancement.  That is, compared to a baseline condition where one is given 
only one exposure to the material before the final test, taking an intervening test can 
improve one’s memory for that material.  In addition, this enhancement is often even 
greater than the enhancement produced by re-studying the material after the initial 
learning episode.  This is called the testing effect (for reviews, see Dempster, 1996; 
Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a). 
 In the prototypical testing effect paradigm, there are three phases:  the initial 
learning episode, the intermediate phase, and the final test.  The phases of most interest 
are typically the latter two.  In the intermediate phase, the subjects are asked to restudy all 
or part of the material from the initial learning episode, or take a test over some or all of 
the material.  The final test is usually comprehensive—covering all material from the 
initial learning episode—and is used to reveal the later mnemonic effects of repeated 
studying or repeated testing.  These two conditions are often compared to a baseline 
condition of items that were only presented during the initial learning phase. 
Basic Findings   
 The testing effect has often been examined with paired-associate 
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learning tasks (Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Carpenter, Pashler, & Vul, 2006; Carpenter, 
Pashler, Wixted, & Vul, 2008, Experiment 3; Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010).  For example 
Carrier and Pashler (1992, Experiment 2) presented subjects with Eskimo words and their 
English equivalent.  Half of these pairs were restudied and the remaining half were 
subjected to retrieval practice.  Memory for Eskimo words and their English equivalents 
was better for those pairs that received retrieval practice. 
 Testing can also enhance memory for paired associates that are weakly related 
(e.g. factory - plant) (Kornell, Hays, & Bjork, 2009, Experiments 3-6; Carpenter, 2009).  
At one level, this is counterintuitive because one might think that weakly related items 
are difficult to encode and are not processed with as much fluency as strongly related 
items—possibly making retrieval even more difficult.  Under these situations, it would 
seem that restudying would be more fruitful than testing.  Surprisingly, testing can 
potentiate learning of weakly related items (especially when coupled with feedback). In 
addition, testing has been shown to enhance retention of obscure, unfamiliar facts (e.g., 
“fake pearls were once made out of fish scales”) (Carpenter et al., 2008, Experiments 1 & 
2).  It is also of interest to note that Carpenter et al. (2008) examined retention at 
unconventionally long intervals (i.e., up to 42 days) and found that retention of the 
material at longer intervals (i.e., 1 day or more) was better when the items were tested in 
the intermediate phase of the experiment. 
 Although the notion of test-enhanced retention of paired associates and obscure 
facts is informative in its own right, it would be practically and theoretically informative 
to know if testing can enhance memory for “natural” or at least richer materials.  
Roediger and Karpicke (2006b) showed test-enhanced memory for short passages taken 
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from the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL).  Here subjects read one 
(Experiment 2) or several (Experiment 1) passages.  In Experiment 1, restudying and 
retrieval practice were manipulated within-subjects—whereas a between-subjects design 
was used in Experiment 2.  In both experiments, the final test was free recall.  On the test, 
subjects were instructed to write down as much of the material as they could remember 
(exact wording and order were not required).  Their responses were then compared 
against 30 pre-specified idea units for scoring.  The results showed that testing enhanced 
memory compared to restudying but this enhancement only emerged after a delay (i.e. 2 
days or 1 week).  When memory was assessed merely 5 minutes after the initial session, 
performance was actually better in the repeated studying condition.  Although 
performance on an immediate test favored repeated studying, repeated testing was more 
effective at retarding forgetting over longer retention intervals. For passages studied 
repeatedly, memory fell off precipitously while passages subjected to retrieval practice 
were forgotten at a much slower rate.  In short, this implies that although repeated 
studying may yield short-term gains in retention, repeated testing can enhance retention 
over the long term.  Despite this result, there is some variability across studies regarding 
when the testing effect emerges.  Some studies report a testing effect on an immediate 
test (e.g., Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Kuo & Hirshman, 1996; Carpenter et al., 2008, 
Experiment 3; Carpenter, 2009) and other studies indicate that the effect does not arise 
until after a delay of approximately 24 hours or more (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b; 
Carpenter et al., 2008, Experiments 1 & 2).   
 At this time the relationship between retention interval and the testing effect is 
unclear.  One would think that providing feedback during retrieval practice should 
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promote an immediate benefit of testing because of the metacognitive benefits of 
feedback.  However, some studies with feedback show an immediate testing effect (e.g., 
Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Carpenter et al., 2008, Experiment 3) while others do not (e.g., 
Carpenter et al., 2008, Experiments 1 & 2).  An immediate testing effect has also been 
found in studies without feedback (e.g., Kuo & Hirshman, 1996; Carpenter, 2009).  Other 
factors such as the number of retrieval practice trials, the type or inherent difficulty of the 
materials, and/or the sheer number of memoranda might influence the time course of the 
testing effect but these aspects will need to be explored more directly by other studies.   
 By now, many of the salient effects of testing should be evident but it should also 
be evident that all of the research described thus far has utilized verbal materials 
exclusively.  A few studies have examined the effects of testing on non-verbal materials 
(e.g., Carpenter & Pashler, 2007; Rohrer, Taylor, & Sholar, 2010).  Carpenter and Pashler 
(2007) used a map-learning paradigm where they manipulated restudying and retrieval 
practice within subjects—but across maps (e.g., restudy Map A then take a test over Map 
B).  The maps were fictitious and comprised of 12 target features.  All subjects were 
given 20 sec. to study the target map before moving on to the respective intermediate 
phase.  For a map in the restudying condition, subjects simply studied the target map for 
100 additional seconds.  If the map was in the retrieval practice condition, the subject 
then saw a version of the map with a feature removed.  They were asked to identify the 
missing feature and covertly form a mental image of it.  To assess their own accuracy on 
the trial, they were shown the map in its entirety and then reported whether or not they 
were able to retrieve the correct missing feature (this self-report served as the dependent 
measure for the retrieval practice phase).  This sequence was repeated until all 12 features 
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were assessed 1 to 2 times.   After a 30-minute filler task, they were given a blank sheet 
of paper and asked to draw both maps as well as they could.  Given the inherent difficulty 
in setting criteria for a map reconstruction test, all drawings were scored against two 
different sets of liberal and stringent criteria.  By all scoring measures, map 
reconstructions were more accurate in the retrieval practice condition.   
 Rohrer et al. (2010) also tested 4th- and 5th-grade students on a map-learning 
paradigm but under slightly different conditions.  The largest difference being that the 
retention interval was much longer (1 day instead of 30 min.).  Also more objective 
measures were used during the intermediate phase and on the final test.  In addition the 
intermediate phase was longer because there were more retrieval practice opportunities 
per map and, to equate processing time, the restudying condition was designed to be of 
equal length.  Despite the different population, retention interval, and method, Rohrer et 
al. (2010) also showed that testing enhanced retention of maps and their feature 
arrangements. 
Understanding the Testing Effect 
 Much of the research on the testing effect explores its generalizability and applied 
utility in educational settings. However, some recent research has begun to explore 
theoretical accounts of the phenomenon.  Initial research on the testing effect helps rule 
out one simple account, the possibility that testing merely provides another presentation 
of the items (i.e., those which can be retrieved) and that this additional processing time 
drives the effect.  Consider a case in which a baseline condition is compared to a 
condition in which subjects received an intervenient test.  Those in the baseline condition 
will encounter the memoranda only once.  However, those who received the intervenient 
6 
test will be incidentally afforded another presentation of any item that they can retrieve. 
To determine if the testing effect reduces to an effect of re-presentation, one needs to 
compare re-studying and retrieval practice when equated on processing time.  Carrier and 
Pashler (1992) did so by providing feedback in the retrieval practice condition of a 
paired-associate learning paradigm.  In the re-study condition, paired associates were 
presented in their entirety for the duration of the trial, 10 seconds.  In the retrieval 
practice condition, the first word in the pair was presented for only the first half of the 
trial (5 sec.).  In this half, subjects were instructed to try to recall the second word in the 
pair.  In the second half (5 sec.), both words were presented regardless of the subject’s 
ability to correctly retrieve the second word.  In this design, overall processing time was 
equated because both re-study and retrieval practice trials lasted 10 seconds.  Under these 
conditions, the testing effect still emerged, indicating that the testing effect is not simply 
due to the effect of an additional presentation of the items (see Dempster, 1996; Roediger 
& Karpicke, 2006b; Butler, 2010 for additional evidence on this point).   
Given that the testing effect is not merely an artifact of additional processing time, 
it must be attributable to more complex mnemonic processes.  Several studies have 
proposed that retrieval difficulty plays a role (Glover, 1989; Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; 
Kornell et al., 2009).  This makes some sense when comparing typical restudying and 
retrieval practice conditions.  The former has virtually no retrieval difficulty because the 
materials are presented intact whereas the latter will always be more difficult because the 
materials are not presented intact throughout.  This simple explanation could be part of 
the foundation of the testing effect but Kornell et al. (2009) offer a supplement that is a 
little more precise.  Their idea is that, the more difficult the retrieval task, the more 
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exploration and elaborative processing one must undergo before reaching the correct 
answer.  Even if the correct answer is not reached, memory will often be better for items 
for which a retrieval attempt was made (Experiments 3-6).  However, one should note 
that this theory’s criteria for establishing the optimal level of difficulty are not 
comprehensive or explicit.  Kornell et al. (2009) manipulated difficulty by varying the 
associative strength of paired associates (e.g., train - track vs. train - caboose) but prior 
studies employed alternative difficulty manipulations.   
Glover (1989, Experiment 4) manipulated difficulty by varying the level of self-
initiated processing demanded by the type of initial test.  Before the final test, subjects 
were randomly assigned to take a recognition, cued recall, or free recall test over 
previously read passages (there was also a control condition that had only one exposure 
to the material).  The type of final test (i.e., recognition, cued recall, or free recall) was 
also crossed factorially with the type of initial test to see if the effect of the difficulty 
manipulation persisted regardless of final test type.  Glover predicted that the size of the 
testing effect should be positively related to the level of self-initiated processing required 
during retrieval practice (regardless of final test type). This means that an initial free 
recall test should create a stronger testing effect than an initial cued-recall or recognition 
test.  Glover observed this exact pattern—regardless of final test type. 
Carpenter and DeLosh (2006) supplemented Glover’s (1989) account with an 
alternative difficulty manipulation. They varied the number of cues presented with an 
item during initial testing.  In their third experiment, Carpenter and DeLosh had 
participants study a series of words that were found to be easily retrievable in one of their 
prior experiments.  These items were selected to equate inherent item difficulty because 
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Carpenter and DeLosh’s focus was on an independent manipulation of difficulty—so 
they had to ensure that item selection effects did not drive their results. To independently 
manipulate difficulty, during retrieval practice they varied the number of letters presented 
for a previously studied word (i.e., 1, 2, 3, or 4 letters).  For example, if a subject had 
previously studied the word cabin, then in the most difficult retrieval condition they 
would be presented with the stem c _ _ _ _ and be asked to recall the correct word.  Using 
this manipulation, Carpenter and DeLosh found that retention on a final test was 
inversely related to the number of letters provided during initial testing.  This is 
presumably because cue scarcity requires more elaborative processing.  In sum, it seems 
that retrieval difficulty moderates the testing effect and that the benefits of retrieval 
difficulty can be conferred through manipulations of cue availability, associative strength, 
or test type. 
In additional to the role of difficulty, other studies have examined how testing 
affects certain kinds of processing.  One approach to this level of analysis would be to 
determine the similarities and differences between the testing effect and other encoding 
manipulations whose effects on processing are more thoroughly understood.  For 
instance, in a between-subjects design, generation—relative to reading—can enhance 
memory for the occurrence of an item but can simultaneously disrupt memory for the 
order in which items were presented (Nairne, Reigler, & Serra, 1991).  This pattern of 
findings indicates that generation typically enhances item specific but disrupts relational 
processing (for a review, see Mulligan & Lozito, 2004).  Because testing also yields clear 
gains in item memory, Karpicke and Zaromb (2010) examined the degree to which 
testing might disrupt order memory—and whether it qualitatively differs from generation.  
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They found that testing enhanced item memory (as measured by a recognition memory 
test) more than generation (Experiment 4), but that it disrupted order memory to the same 
extent (Experiment 3).  So while retrieval practice and generation may differ in the 
degree to which they affect item memory, it can be argued that they both exhibit opposite 
effects on item and order memory.   
 By the same token, the testing effect seems to behave like other “unusual” 
encoding manipulations.  In a recent review, McDaniel and Bugg (2008) noted that 
unusual encoding conditions (e.g. generation, enactment, and perceptual interference) 
often enhance item-specific processing relative to their more common control condition 
(e.g., read items, observed actions, and intact items, respectively), but they do so at the 
expense of disrupting order memory (and possibly other forms of relational memory). In 
a mixed-list design where the unusual encoding condition is intermixed with items from 
the common encoding condition, disruptions in order processing are mitigated by the 
presence of the common items—resulting in the unusual encoding manipulation 
producing better item memory than reading.  However, in a pure list design where all of 
the items are in the unusual encoding condition, the disruption in order processing is so 
severe that the typical enhancement in item memory is washed out and performance is no 
different or worse than in a pure list of the common encoding condition.  One should note 
that this property holds most reliably when the final test is free recall.  This is because 
both item and order information contribute to successful free recall.  If the final test is 
item recognition, the deleterious effects of the unusual encoding condition are often not 
found because successful item recognition is virtually independent of order memory. All 
of that aside, the testing effect may seem more robust than other unusual encoding 
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manipulations because it occurs in free recall in studies employing pure list designs (e.g., 
Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b, Experiment 2; Carpenter, 2009, Experiment 2; Karpicke & 
Zaromb, 2010, Experiment 1) as well as mixed list designs (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006b, Experiment 1; Carpenter, 2009, Experiment 1; Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010, 
Experiment 2).  However, the item-order account provided by McDaniel and Bugg 
(2008) posits only that the unusual encoding condition produces worse memory in a 
between-subjects design.  The benefits of unusual encoding manipulations often 
disappear under such conditions, but this is not a requisite of the item-order tradeoff 
account.  It has been shown that the testing effect is found even in a between-subjects 
design, but its magnitude is still larger in a within-subjects design (see Karpicke & 
Zaromb, 2010, Experiments 1 & 2).  The item-order account predicts this pattern of 
decline.    
 The interim conclusion is that Karpicke and Zaromb’s (2010) results can be 
explained by the item-order account but additional evaluation of their study is required in 
regards to the kind of relational information they examined.  Their results show how 
testing affects relational memory but, as they mentioned, their design examined only one 
kind of relational memory.  Order memory differs from other kinds of relational 
information like semantic associative strength or category membership, and may be more 
sensitive to disruption.  Zaromb and Roediger (2010) proposed that testing enhances 
semantic organizational processing—which facilitates recall. They presented subjects 
with a list of categorized words (i.e., the lists contained equal numbers of words from 
several categories).  In their first experiment, the restudying and retrieval practice 
conditions were manipulated within subjects.  The restudying condition consisted of 8 
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study trials (SS SS SS SS).  There were 2 retrieval practice conditions—one with 2 
intervenient tests (SS ST SS ST) and one with 4 (ST ST ST ST).  Subjects encountered 
the same set of words for the duration of the experiment.  Lastly, the final free recall test 
took place two days later.  
 To assess organizational processing, two measures were used: the adjusted ratio 
of clustering (ARC) and pair frequency (PF).  ARC measures the extent to which the 
category structure of the list is reflected in the order of recall; by measuring the number 
of times members from the same category are recalled in succession (relative to the 
amount of category repetitions expected by chance).  The PF measure assesses subjective 
rather than objective organization by examining how often two words are recalled in 
adjacent positions across recall tests.  This measure of organization does not require that 
adjacent items be from the same category, allowing the assessment of idiosyncratic 
organization of the material. In passing, it should be noted that at least two recall trials 
are required for the PF measure, so this measure could not be assessed in the restudy 
condition.   
 The results showed that, compared to the restudy condition, total recall on the 
final test was higher in both retrieval practice conditions—so a testing effect was found.  
Surprisingly one measure of organization showed no significant differences among the 
conditions while another measure did.  The measure showing no differences was the 
ARC, average ratio of clustering, and the one showing significant differences was the 
pair frequency (PF) measure.   Recall that PF could not be computed for the restudy 
condition so it was only computed for the 2- and 4-test conditions.  It was found that, on 
the final test, the PF score of the 4-test condition was higher than that of the 2-test 
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condition.  In short, only subjective organization (as measured by PF) increased with the 
number of test trials. 
 Zaromb and Roediger speculated that ARC scores did not differ because there 
were so many encoding trials and encoding was manipulated within subjects.  To address 
these matters, a second experiment was conducted in which encoding was manipulated 
between subjects.  Those in the repeated studying condition studied a list twice and those 
in the retrieval practice condition studied a list once and then took a free recall test over 
it.  Both groups studied three different lists of similar semantic composition to that of the 
first experiment.  The final test occurred one day later.  Overall recall was higher in the 
retrieval practice group so a testing effect was found.  ARC scores were also significantly 
higher in the retrieval practice group.  PF scores were not obtained.  These results 
confirm Zaromb and Roediger’s (2010) original hypothesis that testing can enhance 
organizational processing, which facilitates free recall. 
The Effects of Testing Beyond Material That Is Retrieved 
 Most studies on the testing effect have focused on the fate of information that is 
successfully retrieved during initial learning or at least subjected to retrieval practice.  
Though recently some researchers have ventured into examinations of retrieval practice’s 
more systemic effects.  For example Chan (2009) examined the determinants of retrieval-
induced facilitation and retrieval-induced forgetting, but his analysis focused on the 
information that was overtly subjected to retrieval practice (i.e. the presented items).  
However, one must be aware that encoding manipulations can affect information that is 
not overtly retrieved but still central to the task.  Karpicke and Zaromb (2010) and 
Zaromb and Roediger (2010) made it clear that testing can affect relational information 
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but the specifics of their results were not uniform.  Karpicke and Zaromb (2010) found 
that testing impaired one kind of relational memory (serial order), while Zaromb and 
Roediger (2010) found evidence that testing enhanced another kind of relational memory 
(category clustering)—but only under some conditions. 
 The discrepancy between these two studies could be a result of the inherent 
differences in the difficulty of encoding one kind of information over the other; serial 
order is often arbitrary but category membership is often meaningful.  The discrepancy 
could also be due to the manner in which the relational information was processed during 
retrieval practice.  Karpicke and Zaromb (2010) did not test order memory during 
retrieval practice so it could be that order memory was impaired because it initially 
received so little emphasis from the experimenter or the subjects, for that matter.  Zaromb 
and Roediger (2010) did not overtly emphasize category membership in their recall task 
but it is very plausible that the subjects did.  Again, category membership is 
meaningful—which makes it a very useful cue during retrieval.  Given this notion—and 
considering that ARC scores increased at a negatively accelerating rate with each 
successive test—it is reasonable to believe that subjects became more reliant on semantic 
organizational processing over the course of the study.  Of course a direct reconciliation 
of the discrepancies between these studies remains untested. 
 Another manner by which one can examine the fate of non-tested information is 
to investigate the effects of testing on transfer of learning.  Transfer requires that one 
apply previously learned knowledge to novel contexts.  These novel contexts must be, by 
definition, previously untested so these settings provide the proper grounds for examining 
the effects of testing on information that did not overtly receive retrieval practice.  Butler 
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(2010) used this approach with verbal materials and he had subjects study several 
passages that contained facts and concepts1 over various topics.  In his second 
experiment, the restudying and retrieval practice conditions were manipulated within-
subjects.  The final test consisted of inferential questions over previously learned facts or 
concepts.  These questions were not verbatim re-presentations of previous questions; they 
required that a fact or concept be applied in a novel way.   He found that repeated testing 
enhanced transfer of previously learned facts and concepts.  For present purposes, this 
finding will be termed test-enhanced transfer.  A related study by Rohrer et al. (2010) 
found that testing enhanced transfer on a map-learning task.  On the transfer test of their 
second experiment, Rohrer et al. presented children with the names of two previously-
studied cities and then asked the children, when traveling along a specified route, though 
which cities would they pass when going from the origin to the destination?  Rohrer et al. 
found that testing improved performance on this type of question.  Unfortunately, it was 
not entirely clear how much of the test-enhanced transfer was due to initial testing.  On 
the day of the final test, subjects performed a test over the individual map locations first 
and the transfer test followed.  Performance on the transfer test still favored repeated 
testing but the introduction of an intervening test most certainly affected transfer test 
performance and therefore made it difficult to isolate the unique influence of initial 
testing. What these studies (i.e., Rohrer et al., 2010; Butler, 2010; Zaromb & Roediger, 
2010; Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010) implicate—in one way or another—is the influence of 
testing on memory for relationships among items.  Butler (2010) showed that testing 
could enhance memory enough to permit the organized application of multiple pieces of 
                                                 
1
 In his study, Butler (2010) defined facts as information gathered from one sentence and concepts as 
information abstracted from multiple sentences. 
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information downstream.  It can also be inferred that Rohrer et al. (2010) provided at 
least some evidence that testing can create a representation coherent enough to permit the 
derivation of relationships from previously learned information.  Zaromb and Roediger 
(2010) suggested that testing promotes organizational processing but they found that the 
level of observed organization depended on the experimental design and the dependent 
measure. Finally, Karpicke and Zaromb (2010) demonstrated that testing can enhance 
memory for individual items a great deal, but such enhancement comes at the cost of 
significantly disrupting memory for serial order.  However, it is possible that serial order 
is a kind of relational information that is especially sensitive to disruption.  Therefore a 
test of serial order might be too conservative a metric of the amount of preserved 
relational processing.  Furthermore, it has been found that another strong encoding 
manipulation, generation, depletes serial order memory to a much smaller degree when 
the items have a high degree of inter-item relatedness (for a review, see Mulligan & 
Lozito, 2004).  Perhaps this same property applies to the testing effect.  Karpicke and 
Zaromb (2010) did acknowledge that their paradigm was designed to examine only one 
kind of relational information, so generalizations to other kinds of inter-item relationships 
could not be made. 
 In sum, the degree to which testing enhances a knowledge structure (i.e. the 
coherence and organization of memoranda) has not been made clear.  To assess such 
matters (and some other basic empirical questions) a different paradigm would be 
useful—possibly one that examines more tractable properties like abstractions of 
representations.  By abstraction, I mean the process by which one learns a structure that 
relates a set of items to one another (as opposed to simply representing them in isolation).  
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There are of course various degrees and classes of abstraction.  There are instances in 
which one needs to abstract more conceptual properties through induction (such as in 
category/exemplar learning).  There are also narrower instances of abstraction in which 
one need only learn an ordinal hierarchy that ranks items along a single dimension (e.g., 
A > B, B > C, etc.).  Our study takes the first steps in assessing the impact of retrieval 
practice on abstraction so, for reasons to be made self-evident in forthcoming sections, 
our research will focus on the latter kind of abstraction.  As will also be shown later on, 
previous studies on the testing effect have not truly examined abstraction.  Some studies 
(i.e., Rohrer et al., 2010; Butler, 2010) had conditions that approximate the necessary 
examinations for this topic but no unambiguous conclusions can be drawn from them.  
The transitive inference paradigm might prove a viable approach to this problem.  A 
review of transitive inference research immediately follows this section.  After the 
review, the rationale for our current study is explained in greater detail and the design of 
our two novel experiments is provided.   
Transitive Inference 
 Transitive inference is, in many respects, reasoning about concepts or elements 
within a hierarchy. For example, if one is told that Bill is taller than Steve, who is taller 
than Al, one can easily infer that Bill is taller than Al.  This is transitive inference (TI). 
For pedagogical purposes, TI is normally introduced with an example that employs 
superlatives regarding a nameable dimension (such as height), but laboratory settings 
often examine TI with more demanding premises.  Most importantly for our purposes, the 
TI paradigm provides a controlled venue for examining the influence of repeated testing 
on relational processing and representation abstraction because 1) the relationships 
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among the stimuli can be fixed along a single dimension and 2) novel problems can be 
easily constructed from non-adjacent elements of the series.   
 When researchers use TI to examine the abstraction of relationships, the paradigm 
is typically more complex than the example described above.  First of all, TI paradigms 
often involve learning about the relationships among five or more elements.  The 
elements of the stimulus set are usually novel and arbitrarily ranked (i.e., A > B > C > D 
> E).  The adjacent elements make up the premise pairs—whose relationships are taught 
overtly.  That is, participants learn over several trials that A > B, B > C, and so forth.  
The structure of the hierarchy creates inherent differences in the reinforcement histories 
of the elements.  A is always reinforced because it sits at the top of the hierarchy and E is 
always avoided because it rests at the bottom.  The internal elements (B, C, and D) have 
different reinforcement histories; half of the time they are rewarded (e.g. C > D) and, for 
the other half, they are not rewarded (e.g. B > C).  TI paradigms have been used with 
humans and animals (typically rats).  Similar reinforcement histories do arise in both 
groups albeit through different circumstances.  With rats, selection of the correct stimulus 
from a pair yields a tangible reward like food, whereas with humans selection of the 
correct stimulus is typically not accompanied with a reward (though feedback is usually 
provided).  
 In either case, subjects learn the premise pairs and then advance to a final test.  On 
the final test, their memory for the basic premise pairs (e.g. B > C) is assessed and they 
are also presented with novel combinations of the elements to determine the extent to 
which they demonstrate TI (i.e., to measure the extent to which they have abstracted the 
relationships among items never presented together).  Finally, it should be noted that for a 
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five-element stimulus set, there is only one combination that provides a true test of 
transitive inference. The AE pair does not provide this test because both elements have 
consistent reinforcement histories.  In fact, any transitive test pair involving A can be 
solved by merely remembering that A was always reinforced.  Conversely, any transitive 
test pair involving E can be solved by merely remembering that E was always 
unrewarded.  Therefore the only appropriate transitive test pair is BD.  In this context, 
transitive inference is operationalized by the choice of B in the BD pairing.   
Basic Findings & Theoretical Accounts of TI  
 Using this basic paradigm, transitive inference has been observed with rats using 
odors as the elements (Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997; Van Elzakker, O’Reilly, & Rudy, 
2003).  With humans it has been found when using non-verbal materials like Japanese 
Hiragana characters (Greene, Spellman, Dusek, Eichenbaum, & Levy, 2001; Frank, 
Rudy, Levy, & O’Reilly, 2005), abstract images (Libben & Titone, 2008), and basic 
shapes (Lazareva & Wasserman, 2010).  Dusek and Eichenbaum (1997) proposed that 
transitive inference is the result of explicit, declarative representational flexibility 
because lesions to structures connecting the hippocampus to cortical or sub-cortical areas 
in rats impairs performance on transitive pairs while leaving performance on the overtly 
learned adjacent pairs intact.  Of course their conclusion largely hinges on the notion that 
the hippocampus is involved exclusively in explicit relational processing (for an 
alternative account, see Frank, Rudy, & O’Reilly, 2003). Dusek and Eichenbaum’s 
(1997) explicit processing-based account of TI assumes that all elements of the premise 
pairs have equal associative strengths.  This means that, in a paradigm with five elements, 
A through E, the strength of the association between the first premise pair, AB, should be 
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equal to the associative strength between all other adjacent pairs.  Furthermore—in a 
paradigm with six elements, A through F, the strength of the association between 
elements of the internal pairs (BC, CD, and DE) should all be equal.  So, according to the 
explicit processing account, TI performance should be equal on the novel BD, CE, and 
BE pairs because the weights connecting each element in the chain have equal strength.  
To the contrary, several studies have found this to be false; performance on the BE pair 
tends to be much better than the other two novel TI pairs, CD and BD (Van Elzakker et 
al., 2003; Frank et al., 2005; Libben & Titone, 2008).  All of this aside, one could still 
argue that the TI paradigm measures abstraction—though this abstraction need not form a 
declarative memory.  
 Though, to be clear, this alternative theoretical account of transitive inference is 
not proposing that transitive inference is devoid of relational processing; it only means 
that TI is not always achieved through an entirely explicit and logical process.  What this 
means for our yet-to-be-proposed study is that any enhancement in performance cannot 
be attributed to an augmentation of explicit logical processes.  If, on the other hand, our 
experimental manipulation promotes awareness of the hierarchy among the stimuli, then 
the use of explicit logical processes can ensue.  
 On a related note, some studies have shown that declarative awareness of the 
hierarchy is not necessary for successful performance but it is associated with better 
performance (Green et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2005; Libben & Titone, 2008; Lazareva & 
Wasserman, 2010).  This means that, when TI performance is at ceiling, a declarative 
strategy is at play.  If there is a gradient in TI, where performance is better when the 
elements are farther apart, then implicit/non-declarative reasoning probably takes place.  
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This spectrum of performance is a potential boon for our study because, under the right 
conditions, we can examine different sorts of transitive inference. 
The Double-Function List: Relative of the TI Paradigm 
 As stated earlier, the TI paradigm has not been heavily used in conventional 
episodic memory research.  However, there are a few studies employing the double-
function list paradigm (which is a close relative of the TI paradigm). Consideration of 
these studies might inform our expectations about the effect of testing on transitive 
inference.  In the double-function list paradigm, subjects learn a series of cue-target pairs 
in which the cue for each pair serves as the target for another pair.  For example, one 
might have to learn pairs such as eye-hat, hat-jug, jug-cat, etc. (Primoff, 1938).  These 
pairs are presented in a random order to cloud the relationships among them.  One critical 
difference between this paradigm and the TI paradigm is that in a double-function list, the 
target of the last pair in the list serves as the cue in the first pair.  This effectively links 
the stimuli into a loop of paired associates; there is no hierarchy. 
 Primoff’s (1938) classic study was originally designed to investigate why learning 
overlapping associations (e.g. A-B, B-C, C-D, & D-A) is more difficult than learning 
only isolated associations (e.g. A-B and C-D).  In some cases, learning double-function 
lists can take twice as long as single-function lists (Primoff, 1938; Slamecka, 1976).  
What is most important for present purposes is that the overlap among the stimuli and the 
dilemma of encoding such overlap are integral properties shared by the double-function 
list and transitive inference paradigms.  This commonality between the two paradigms 
can guide our predictions about an amalgam of the TI and testing effect paradigms.  
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Slamecka’s (1976) re-evaluation of double-function lists incidentally provided such 
guidance. 
 Before delving into Slamecka’s (1976) work, it should be noted that Primoff 
(1938) concluded that learning a double-function list is so arduous because of the 
pervasive interference.  Slamecka (1976) acknowledged that this conclusion was 
reasonable but that Primoff (1938) did not identify the locus of interference.  Did it 
originate in encoding, retrieval or both?  Over the course of three experiments, Slamecka 
(1976) concluded that the interference arose from processes at encoding and retrieval, but 
that retrieval was more culpable.  At encoding, the immediate backward associate was 
significantly problematic; no other associate had a significant effect.  For example, if one 
had already learned the pair eye-hat, then learning hat-jug would be impeded by eye in 
the eye-hat pair.  Retrieval proved particularly problematic because, upon retrieving a 
given paired associate, interference arose from immediate and distant associates. The 
immediate backward associate was the primary source of impediment.  More distant 
associates in both the backward and forward directions contributed to interference as 
well, but to a lesser degree. So both encoding and retrieval were both deemed sources of 
difficulty, but difficulty at retrieval (i.e., production) was the most observable (and most 
comprehensively evaluated in the three experiments).  Insofar as double-function list 
learning is similar to transitive learning, Slamecka’s (1976) results suggest that repeated 
testing would impair transitive learning more than restudying. 
Rationale for the Current Study 
 Indirect support for our current study can be found in Butler’s (2010) study on 
test-enhanced transfer.  Although Butler’s (2010) study is not directly comparable to a 
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standard transitive inference paradigm, Butler’s use of inferential questions on the final 
test is relevant2.  The inferential questions required the use of only one previously learned 
fact to resolve a question that was related to the studied domain—but whose answer was 
not overtly taught.  Butler provided the following example:  participants might read in a 
passage “there are over 1,000 bat species.”  On a later inferential question, they would be 
asked, “If there are about 5,500 species of mammals in the world, approximately what 
percent of all mammal species are species of bat?”  To answer successfully, a participant 
would first recall that there are at least 1,000 bat species and then divide that number by 
5,500 to then conclude that bats account for approximately 20% of all mammal species.  
This inferential aspect is akin to a transitive inference problem but recall that a TI 
problem incorporates two previously learned elements—whereas Butler’s (2010) 
inferential questions incorporated one—and TI problems do not require one to respond to 
questions providing completely novel information (i.e., that there are 5,500 species of 
mammal in the world).  Even though Butler’s (2010) design is not directly comparable to 
a transitive inference paradigm, it implies that repeated testing can facilitate applying 
previously learned knowledge to situations that require one to incorporate that knowledge 
in the production of a novel response to a novel question.  If this is the case, then repeated 
testing should enhance TI performance compared to restudying.   
 However, a central demand of transitive learning is overcoming the deleterious 
effects of interference accumulation.  One must at least understand that there are 
overlapping associations among the stimuli (e.g., B > C and C > D), but one must also 
make sure not to confuse them and/or produce the incorrect response.  While the impact 
                                                 
2
 One might think that the conceptual questions would be most comparable to TI questions.  However, the 
concepts were taught overtly and, in TI paradigms, the transitive test pairs are not.  Therefore the 
conceptual questions would not be the best analogue of TI test pairs. 
23 
of retrieval practice on this exact kind of interference has not been studied, there is some 
evidence that testing can at least reduce proactive interference.  Szpunar, McDermott, 
and Roediger (2008, Experiment 1A) had participants learn 5 lists of interrelated words.  
The lists contained words from the same semantic categories but no word appeared in 
more than one list.  In the retrieval practice condition, participants took a free recall test 
after studying each list.  Those in the restudying condition solved math problems after 
each list.  The fifth and final list was the only one for which both groups received a free 
recall test.  Here it was found that those in the retrieval practice condition recalled more 
words overall and committed fewer prior list intrusions.  While these results bode well 
for instances akin to list-learning, the conclusions drawn from them cannot be directly 
applied to transitive learning because the interference observed in Szpunar et al. (2008) 
was across multiple lists rather than within a single list.  Therefore it is not entirely clear 
if in their case testing actually helped resolve interference among overlapping 
associations, if it promoted temporal event segmentation, or both.  On the other hand, 
Slamecka’s (1976) double-function list-learning study, by its very nature, did focus on 
within-list associations and found that retrieval impaired list acquisition more than 
studying.  However, Slamecka’s (1976) study was designed in the verbal learning 
tradition of the time so it used alternating study and test trials; participants were not 
randomly assigned in a between-subjects fashion to a middle phase of mass restudying or 
testing.  As will be shown later, our study manipulates restudying and retrieval practice 
between subjects to more directly assess the impact of intervenient encoding 
manipulations like these.  Though, insofar as our current study is comparable to a double-
function list paradigm, we should find that repeated testing enhances memory for the 
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premise pairs but does not facilitate the formation of hierarchical representations—and 
may even hinder it.    
The Importance of Abstraction 
 Recall that Butler (2010) demonstrated that testing could enhance transfer of 
learning.  While his findings are meritorious in their own right, they do not demonstrate 
abstraction.  Butler (2010) did not aim to examine that but the reader should be made 
aware of the differences so that the unique contribution of our study will be evident.  One 
might think that performance on the conceptual questions demonstrates abstraction 
because successful completion of them required combining information learned from 
multiple sentences of a passage.  However, answers to the conceptual (and factual) 
questions were taught overtly during retrieval practice.  Although a retrieval attempt was 
required during these intervenient tests, feedback was given regardless of accuracy.  This 
likely promoted a form of stimulus-response learning for both the conceptual and factual 
questions.  Also the inferential questions did not require the flexible recombination of 
previously learned elements. In essence, the subjects were not left entirely up to their own 
devices to derive the conceptual information. So it would appear that testing only 
increased the likelihood of transfer of overtly taught information.  The only requirement 
on the subject’s part was that they remember and recognize the relevance of previously 
learned units information.  The effect of repeated testing on one’s ability to form new 
knowledge structures and derive relationships from them is still uncertain.    
 Rohrer et al.’s (2010) map learning study might also appear to demonstrate 
abstraction but aspects of their design leave the matter uncertain.  One critical issue was 
that an unlabeled map was present for the entirety of the transfer test. This was probably 
25 
done because their subjects were children and it makes the test much more manageable.  
Regardless, it does not allow one to see if their subjects truly abstracted the topography.  
On a transitive inference test, the analogue of that approach would be presenting a 
hierarchy with empty slots and then asking the subjects to make transitive inferences; 
they would then be made aware of the knowledge structure by an external agent.  
Furthermore Rohrer et al.’s (2010) design does not allow one to easily examine the 
systematic effects retrieval practice bears on a knowledge structure.  Since TI paradigms 
with 6 or more elements contain TI pairs of varying difficulty, one could determine if 
testing affects the finer and/or coarser aspects of a knowledge structure. 
Additional Advantages of the TI Paradigm 
 An amalgam of the TI and testing effect paradigms provides a different angle for 
examining the effects of testing on relational processing but this alone does not 
necessitate such an undertaking.  However, there are several additional advantages of 
such an amalgam. 
 First of all, this approach allows one to examine the effect of testing on a specific 
kind of reasoning:  hierarchy abstraction.  Also one can specify and hold constant the 
relationship(s) among the stimuli.  The use of richer or more naturalistic materials often 
does not permit this kind of specification so it then becomes difficult to identify which 
kinds of relationships are influenced by testing.  One can bluntly assess the impact of an 
encoding manipulation on associative memory formation, but one must acknowledge that 
associations are not uniform in their classification.  The kinds of associations one must 
learn are usually defined by specific relationships (e.g., x is greater than/less than y; x is 
an exemplar of y; y is a function of x; x is necessary for y to occur; x came before y).  
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Richer materials often contain an assortment of several classes of relationships.  Given 
the variety of potential associations, it is important to specify (and control for) the kind of 
relationship being examined. 
 An amalgam of the two paradigms also provides a practical advantage. The 
testing format of a typical TI paradigm allows one to hold the response format constant 
while varying the question difficulty (i.e., adjacent pair vs. TI pair).  This ensures that 
differences in the difficulty among question types are not confounded by response output 
demands.  For example if one wanted to assess the effect of item difficulty, one would 
not use a recognition test for the easy items and a recall test for difficult ones.  Such a 
design conflates item difficulty with response demands.  This is not a problem in the TI 
paradigm because the response demands are the same for every question:  press a key.  
However, some questions are over adjacent pairs and others are over transitive pairs.  
Thus the two types of questions differ only on two dimensions: 1) whether or not the 
relationship between the elements is direct and 2) whether or not the relationship being 
assessed was overtly taught. 
Experiment 1 
Methods 
 Participants. Fifty-six undergraduates were recruited in exchange for course 
credit.  All were young adults who reported having normal or corrected-to-normal 20/20 
vision.  Also none of the participants reported having color blindness.   
 Materials.  In our adaptation of the TI paradigm, the stimuli were paintings by 
largely unknown artists.  All paintings were of ordinary landscapes and skyscapes3.  
                                                 
3
 These paintings were taken from stimuli compiled by Kornell and Bjork (2008) in a study on induction.  
They were found to not be overly distinctive but subjects could remember them at above chance levels.  
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Paintings were chosen as the stimuli because the standard TI paradigm uses nonsense 
figures with many, many trials. In these settings, the goal is to use stimuli that are not 
easily labeled, and whose properties are not easily placed on any sort of discrete 
continuum. For this reason we wanted to use non-verbal materials. However, we also 
needed to have intermediate levels of performance and room for increase due to re-study 
or retrieval practice.  Consequently, we sought unfamiliar paintings because they are 
easier to learn than non-sense shapes (and so can be learned in a few trials), but are not 
easily labeled or given verbal codes. We randomly chose seven paintings from the bank 
provided by Kornell and Bjork (2008).  Each painting came from a different artist.  The 
paintings were counterbalanced across subjects so that they appeared in all positions of 
the hierarchy and both sides of the screen equally often.   
 Design & Procedures.  During initial learning, the paintings were presented in 
pairs on a computer screen to convey which was the more valuable of the two.  Three 
green dollar signs appeared below the more valuable one at the onset of the trial and 
remained for its duration.  The subjects’ task was to press a corresponding key to confirm 
that they understood which painting was the more valuable (the z key for paintings 
appearing on the left and the m key for those on the right).  For every trial, a pair 
appeared for 7.5 sec and then a cross hair appeared for 500 ms; the next pair followed in 
the same manner.  All pairs were presented 3 times in a block-randomized manner.  This 
means that all pairs were presented in a random order and then this process repeated two 
more times (each time in a new random order).  During initial learning, the participants’ 
task was to memorize the relationships in these premise pairs because their memory for 
them would be tested later.  The nature of the final test was not conveyed. After the 
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learning phase, participants restudied the premise pairs or were tested over all of the pairs 
they had just learned.  These phases were the restudying and retrieval practice conditions, 
respectively, and they were manipulated between subjects.  This was necessary to 
examine the pure effects of one strategy versus another.  Not to mention that, given the 
inter-related nature of the knowledge structure, manipulating encoding within subjects 
would have likely created diffusion across the two conditions.   
 The restudying phase was identical to the initial learning phase with only a few 
changes.  The subjects were reminded of the initial instructions but were also told that 
they were being given additional time to study the premise pairs before the memory test.  
The retrieval practice condition proceeded differently.  Subjects were told that this phase 
was practice for the later memory test.  The overall time for each trial was the same as the 
other phases (7.5 sec), but 5 sec of that time were devoted to retrieval practice and the 
remaining 2.5 sec were devoted to computer-provided feedback.  During the first 5 
seconds, they were presented with one of the premise pairs and asked to indicate which 
was the more valuable of the two by pressing the appropriate key (z or m).  After 5 
seconds, three green dollar signs appeared below the correct painting for 2.5 seconds—
regardless of whether or not they could retrieve the correct answer.  A crosshair then 
appeared for 500 ms and the next pair followed.  All premise pairs were tested (or 
restudied) 3 times in a block-randomized manner. 
 A mental arithmetic distractor task followed the second phase.  Here subjects had 
to complete true/false arithmetic problems for 6 minutes.  For each problem, they were 
shown an answer that could be true or false.  They had up to 15 sec to decide.  In addition 
the computer provided feedback after every trial.  The feedback indicated whether or not 
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they solved the problem correctly, and a running percent correct was displayed as well.  
This was provided to help them gauge their accuracy and to ensure that they were 
engaging in the task.  However, no fixed level of accuracy was desired.  They were 
simply told to do their personal best. 
 Immediately after this distractor phase came the final memory test.  Subjects were 
tested over all of the relationships they were taught explicitly (e.g. “Which is worth more:  
A or B?”), and over the relationships they were not taught explicitly (e.g. “Which is 
worth more:  B or E?”).  The latter kind of question required transitive inference and such 
questions appeared only on the final test.  All possible combinations of the elements were 
tested 4 times in a block-randomized fashion.  This is typically done in TI studies to 
provide reliable accuracy estimates of the pairs.  Of course no feedback was given on the 
final test and the questions were self-paced.  The subjects were told that they would see 
pairs of paintings multiple times and that they should try to recall the correct answer.  If 
they were not sure, they were instructed to give their best guess.  Once the final test was 
complete, they were asked to fill out an awareness questionnaire described in Appendix 
A. Awareness of the hierarchy can facilitate performance and it can be assessed with a 
post-experiment questionnaire.  The questionnaire asked participants if they were 
generally aware of a hierarchy and if they could explicate it.  We used questionnaires 
adapted from another transitive inference study (Frank et al., 2005).  In this experiment, 
the questionnaire was only used for potential post-hoc comparisons.  After they 
completed the questionnaire, subjects were debriefed and dismissed. 
Results 
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 Two participants were excluded from the full analysis because their premise pair 
memory on the final test was more than 2 standard deviations below their respective 
group means.  One participant was dropped from the restudy group and one from the 
retrieval practice group.  All subsequent analyses are based on the remaining 54 
participants.  
 Phase 2 Retrieval Practice Performance.  We first examined performance during 
the retrieval practice phase in order to check our manipulation.  Performance on the first 
block (M = .83, SD = .17) was significantly above chance, t(26) = 10.365, p < .001.  
Therefore the 3 blocks dedicated to initial learning were sufficient for inducing above 
chance premise pair memory.  This ensured that participants had acquired a 
representation sufficiently stable for engaging in retrieval practice.  Average performance 
across all three blocks was also good but not at ceiling (M = .82, SD = .14). 
 Overall Final Test Performance.  For premise pair memory, we found no 
significant difference between restudying and retrieval practice, t(52) < 1.  This result 
facilitates interpreting potential differences in representational flexibility because they 
cannot be attributed to differences in overall memory strength of the premises. 
 We then analyzed performance on the non-adjacent pairs.  For the first such 
analysis, we broke these pairs down into two general types of problems: those involving a 
combination of an anchoring element (i.e. painting A or painting G) and a non-adjacent 
internal element, and those involving a combination of only non-adjacent internal 
elements (e.g., B v. D; C v. E, etc.).  The former type will henceforth be referred to as 
anchored pairs and the latter, TI pairs.  This analysis served two purposes:  1) to act as a 
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manipulation check to ensure that we were examining the typical pattern of results in TI 
studies and 2) to examine group differences in overall representational flexibility.  
 A 2 x 2 (Encoding by Problem Type) repeated measures ANOVA showed that 
there was no main effect of encoding, F < 1.  There also was no encoding by problem 
type interaction, F (1, 52) = 1.329, MSE = .018, p =.248.  However, we did find a 
significant main effect of problem type, F (1, 52) = 30.873, MSE = .405, p < .001 .  
Overall percent correct was higher for anchored pairs than TI pairs.  This is typical of TI 
studies (Van Elzakker et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2005).  The critical result, however, was 
that there was no difference in TI between encoding conditions.   
Figure 1. Experiment 1 Performance on Anchored & TI Pairs 
 
 
 A non-significant difference in performance on the anchored pairs is to be 
expected because they can be solved via simple approach/avoid strategies.  Therefore, 
any encoding manipulation is unlikely to confer any additional benefits to performance.  
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Recall, however, that problems involving the non-adjacent internal elements of the 
hierarchy are the best tests of TI because these elements have variable reinforcement 
histories, and so cannot be solved via simple approach/avoid strategies.  Since we found 
no significant differences in overall TI, we concluded that there were no significant 
differences in overall representational flexibility.  However, it is possible that one 
encoding condition may have exhibited superior performance on a certain kind of TI 
problem.  To examine this, we assessed TI for coarse- and fine-grained problems.  Recall 
that TI problems BD, CE, and DF require evaluating the minimum number of premises 
for a true TI problem:  two.  They also typically require a more discerning evaluation 
because there is less symbolic distance between the elements.  As such, these problems 
were collapsed into the fine-grained condition.  The remaining TI problems (BF, BE, and 
CF) encompass 3 or more premises so they were collapsed into the coarse-grained 
condition.  The following analyses are based on these categorizations. 
 A 2 x 2 (Encoding by Grain Size) repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there 
was no main effect of encoding and no encoding by grain size interaction (both F’s < 1).  
However, there was a marginally significant main effect of grain size, F (1, 52) = 3.736, 
MSE = .0068, p = .059.  Of the TI problems, coarse-grained problems were somewhat 
easier to solve than fine-grained ones.  Other TI studies involving more than 5 elements 
have found a similar pattern (Van Elzakker et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2005). 
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 Performance on Coarse- & Fine-Grained Pairs 
 
 
 These results show that the previous non-significant difference in overall TI 
extended to both grain sizes.  Therefore, we can conclude that, under these conditions, 
both encoding manipulations yield comparable profiles in representational flexibility—
regardless of grain size.  For a summary of performance on all measures analyzed thus far 
broken down by encoding condition, see Table 1. 
Table 1. Experiment 1 Final Test Performance 
 Retrieval Practice Restudying 
Premise Pairs .81 (.13) .81 (.15) 
Problem Type: 
Anchored .87 (.17) .87 (.17) 
Transitive Inference .78 (.25) .72 (.27) 
TI by Grain Size: 
Coarse-Grained Problems .79 (.29) .76 (.29) 
Fine-Grained Problems .76 (.25) .69 (.28) 
Note. Means are displayed with standard deviations in parentheses. 
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 Final Test Performance Broken Down by Test Half.  A potential concern for the 
typical TI paradigm is that any differences between conditions could wash out over the 
course of the final test.  Transitive inference trials are conventionally assessed multiple 
times over multiple test blocks. However, as the test progresses, the learning histories of 
the encoding conditions begin to develop more commonality and thus their initial 
differences might become obscured.  To investigate this possibility, we broke down 
performance by test half to see if the pattern of differences changed qualitatively over the 
course of the test. 
 In short, we found that the pattern of differences we observed in our initial 
analysis did not differ qualitatively across the test halves.  We only found a small (~4%) 
drop in premise pair memory across the test halves.  Most importantly, this effect did not 
interact with encoding; thus the rate of decline was the same for both conditions.  For a 
more detailed discussion of the analysis, the interested reader is directed to Appendix B. 
 Interim Conclusions.  Our initial analyses showed that there were no differences 
in representational flexibility—regardless of grain size.  Our exploratory analyses of 
performance across test halves also found that this pattern did not qualitatively change as 
the test progressed.  Although premise pair memory did show a small but significant drop 
in the second half, the rate of decline did not differ between groups.  Therefore, for every 
epoch of the test, it appears that there was no qualitative change in the pattern of non-
significance. 
Awareness Questionnaires 
 Recall that Frank et al. (2005) and Libben and Titone (2008) have shown that the 
degree of awareness of the hierarchy is positively associated with TI.  Those who 
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demonstrate awareness of the hierarchy perform better than those who show no 
awareness.  As such, we wanted to examine TI differences between the conditions when 
controlling for awareness. 
 Awareness Criteria.  The questionnaire we adapted from Frank et al. (2005) has 
no criteria for weighting responses to compute an “awareness score”; rather it simply 
asks increasingly specific questions to determine if someone is aware of the hierarchical 
nature of the memoranda.  Participants were deemed aware if they could clearly convey 
that they noticed the hierarchy among the paintings.  However, they need not use the 
word hierarchy, they could simply state that they noticed that the paintings were ranked 
from least valuable to most.  Also—a participant did not need to be able to explicate the 
hierarchy in its entirety.  It is possible that a participant could be aware of the fact that 
there is a hierarchy, but have imperfect memory of the entire structure.  This is not an 
unreasonable distinction given that TI performance overall was well above chance but 
below ceiling. 
 Participants who were deemed unaware demonstrated no clear knowledge of the 
hierarchy.  Those who said that they went with instinct or guessed were deemed unaware.  
Those who said they based their judgments on the perceptual characteristics were also 
deemed unaware because the perceptual characteristics of the paintings (e.g., color, 
vividness, style) were orthogonal to their rank.  Some participants reported that they 
thought the paintings were organized around a structure, but reported the wrong structure.  
For this, they were deemed unaware because endorsing the wrong structure leads to 
incorrect inferences.  Finally, some participants just reported that they did not notice 
anything and for this they were also deemed unaware.  
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 Reliability Analyses.  Of the 54 subjects, the responses for 46 of them were 
evaluated by two raters (the author, M. P., and a research assistant).  The raters were 
always blind to the encoding condition.  Eight responses were not included in the 
reliability analysis because they were discussed as examples by both raters in order to 
establish and evaluate criteria.  Of the remaining 46 responses, we observed good 
reliability (proportion agreement = .90).  For the eight example responses, their agreed 
upon evaluation (i.e., aware or unaware) was entered into the subsequent analyses of 
awareness.  For the remaining 46 responses, those that received unanimous agreement 
from both raters were automatically entered into the subsequent analyses.  Those for 
which the raters disagreed were discussed until an agreement was reached.  This final 
evaluation was then entered into the subsequent analyses. 
 Awareness Rates.  The proportions of aware and unaware participants were not 
significantly different between groups, χ2 < 1.  Therefore, the majority of participants in 
both groups became aware of the hierarchical structure and the rate of awareness did not 
differ significantly between groups.  This is not too surprising given that the nature of the 
hierarchy was likely more obvious than in many TI studies.  The paintings were 
presented in terms of worth.  Even though no dollar amounts were appended to any 
painting, worth is a familiar, meaningful dimension.  Most TI studies provide no obvious 
dimension on which one can rank the stimuli—only their relative preferences are 
reinforced through massed trial-by-trial feedback. 
 Effects of Serendipitous Awareness.  Before evaluating TI differences as a 
function of awareness, we needed to assess differences in premise pair memory.  If 
present, they could mediate differences in TI.  A 2 x 2 (Encoding by Awareness) 
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ANOVA showed that there was no main effect of encoding (F < 1) and no encoding by 
awareness interaction (F < 1).  We did, however, find a significant main effect of 
awareness, F (1, 50) = 8.075, MSE = .148, p < .01.  Participants deemed aware had better 
premise pair memory than those deemed unaware. This is somewhat consistent with prior 
studies.  When awareness is experimentally induced, it can lead to greater premise pair 
memory (Greene et al., 2001) or expedite acquisition of the premise pairs (Libben & 
Titone, 2008).  The rates of awareness and a breakdown of premise pair memory are all 
shown in Table 2.  
Table 2.  Awareness Rates & Premise Pair Memory 
 
Retrieval Practice Restudying 
Aware 20 19 
Unaware 7 8 
 
  
Aware .84 (.12) .86 (.14) 
Unaware .75 (.15)   .71 (.13) 
 
Note. The upper half of the table displays the raw numbers of participants in each encoding condition who 
were classified as aware and unaware.  The lower half of the panel displays the premise pair memory 
means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for each encoding condition broken down by awareness 
classification. 
 
We then examined differences in overall TI (regardless of grain size).  A 2 x 2 
(Encoding by Awareness) ANOVA revealed no main effect of encoding, F (1, 50) = 
1.505, MSE = .093, p = .226.  There was also no encoding by awareness interaction, F (1, 
50) = 2.045, MSE = .126, p = .159.  However, there was a significant main effect of 
awareness, F (1, 50) = 4.916, MSE = .303, p < .05.  By and large, aware participants 
outperformed unaware participants on TI pairs.  This did not differ significantly between 
encoding conditions.   
 Finally, since awareness has been found to modulate grain size effects in TI 
(Frank et al., 2005; Libben & Titone, 2008), we structured our last analysis of awareness 
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around coarse- and fine-grained TI problems.  Using a 2 x 2 x 2 (Encoding by Awareness 
by Grain Size) repeated measures ANOVA, we found no main effect of encoding, F (1, 
50) = 1.505, MSE = .186, p = .226, and no main effect of grain size, F (1, 50) = 1.012, 
MSE = .018, p = .319.  Like before, there was a significant main effect of awareness, F 
(1, 50) = 4.916, MSE = .607, p < .05, but no interaction between encoding and awareness, 
F (1, 50) = 2.045, MSE = .252, p = .159.  There was, however, a marginally significant 
interaction between grain size and awareness, F (1, 50) = 2.818, MSE = .05, p = .099.  No 
other interaction approached significance (all F’s < 1, all p’s > .38). 
Figure 3. Experiment 1 – TI by Awareness 
 
 
 
 As in the preceding analysis, aware participants overall outperformed unaware 
participants.  The current analysis extended this finding to both grain sizes.  Although 
there were hints of interactions between awareness and encoding, as well as awareness 
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and grain size, neither of these reached significance.  This is likely due to the same 
reasons encoding and awareness did not interact in the preceding analysis when TI was 
collapsed across grain sizes. 
Conclusions  
 Under these conditions, retrieval practice and restudying yielded no differences in 
transitive inferences; nor did they differ across grain sizes, awareness, or any 
combination thereof.  Also note that premise pair memory was equal between the two 
conditions so the interpretations of TI ability were rather straightforward.  Furthermore, 
under the current experimental design, both encoding conditions made most participants 
aware of the hierarchy, thereby facilitating transitive inferences.  This facilitation seemed 
to extend to both coarse- and fine-grained problems.  As one might intuit, aware 
participants had better premise pair memory and outperformed unaware participants on 
all forms of TI.  Critically, this did not differ between the two encoding conditions.  By 
all measures, this design yielded no significant or meaningful differences in 
representational flexibility between the groups. 
 The non-significant differences observed in this experiment could be the true 
absence of a difference or a result of our experimental design.  Given that there were 
relatively few blocks in the intermediate phase (i.e., retrieval practice or restudying), we 
felt that our null results could be attributable to an insufficient manipulation of retrieval 
practice.  It is possible that using only 3 blocks in the intermediate phase rendered the 
retrieval practice and restudy groups too similar.  Therefore, our next experiment 
strengthened the manipulation by increasing the number of blocks in the intermediate 
phase to 6.  In addition, performance was relatively high following initial learning—
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raising the possibility that there was not enough room to examine the effects of the 
encoding manipulation.  Thus, we cut down the number of initial learning blocks from 3 
to 2.  Note that this still leaves a total of 8 learning blocks (a 33% increase in total 
learning time).  An even number of blocks was required to ensure that the number of 
presentations on each side of the screen was equal for each painting in a premise pair.  
Finally, also note how this design structures the learning conditions so that participants 
now spend the majority of their learning time (75%) in their respective encoding 
condition.  In the previous experiment, they spent only 50% of their learning time in their 
respective condition.  As we shall see, this change was sufficient to induce differences 
between the two groups. 
Experiment 2 
Methods 
 Participants.  Fifty-six undergraduates were recruited in exchange for course 
credit.  None of them had participated in the previous experiment.  All were young adults 
who reported having normal or corrected-to-normal 20/20 vision.  None of the 
participants reported having color blindness.   
 Materials.  The materials were the same as those used in Experiment 1. 
 Design & Procedures.  The design was the same as Experiment 1 (i.e., between-
subjects).  We only modified the way in which study time was distributed.  The number 
of initial learning blocks was reduced to 2 and the number of intervenient learning blocks 
was increased to 6; yielding 8 total blocks.  All other aspects of the encoding, distractor, 
and final test phases were the same as Experiment 1. 
Results 
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Two participants were excluded from the full analysis because their premise pair 
memory on the final test was more than 2 standard deviations below their respective 
group means.  One participant was dropped from the restudying group and one from the 
retrieval practice group.  All subsequent analyses are based on the remaining 54 
participants.  When necessary, the degrees of freedom were corrected for unequal 
variances. 
 Phase 2 Retrieval Practice Performance.   We first examined performance during 
the retrieval practice phase in order to check our manipulation.  Performance on the first 
block (M = .72, SD = .23) was significantly above chance, t(26) = 4.996, p < .001.  This 
shows that the 2 blocks dedicated to initial learning were still sufficient for inducing 
above chance premise pair memory before moving on to the intermediate phase.  Mean 
performance across all blocks was also good but not at ceiling (M = .81, SD = .15). 
 Overall Final Test Performance.  For premise pair memory, there was no 
significant difference between encoding conditions, t(52) = 1.004, p = .32.  Because the 
groups did not differ in this regard, any subsequent differences in transitive inference can 
be interpreted solely in terms of representational flexibility and not as mediated by 
differences in overall memory strength of the premises. 
 As in the first experiment, we analyzed performance on the non-adjacent pairs.  
Recall that this analysis serves as a manipulation check on anchored and TI pairs, and as 
a test for any differences in overall TI.  A 2 x 2 (Encoding by Problem Type) repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a marginally significant main effect of encoding [F(1, 52) = 
3.268, MSE = .193, p = .076], a significant main effect of problem type [F(1, 52) = 
22.975, MSE = .707, p < .001], and a significant encoding by problem type interaction, 
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F(1, 52) = 5.261, MSE = .162, p < .05.  Pair-wise comparisons revealed that performance 
on the anchored pairs was equivalent across groups, t(52) < 1.  However, the restudying 
group outperformed the retrieval practice group on the TI pairs, t(45.071) = 2.360, p < 
.025. 
Figure 4. Experiment 2 Performance on Anchored & TI Pairs 
 
 
Although the previous analysis demonstrated an advantage in the restudying 
group for overall TI, it is possible that their advantage is exclusive to just one type of TI 
problem.  Therefore we broke down the TI problems into coarse- and fine-grained 
problems (as in Experiment 1).  A 2 x 2 (Encoding by Grain Size) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of encoding,  F(1, 52) = 5.572, MSE = 
.709, p < .025.  There was no main effect of grain size [F (1, 52) = 2.278, MSE = .047, p 
= .137], nor was there an encoding by grain size interaction, F < 1.  The restudying group 
outperformed the retrieval practice group on all TI pairs—regardless of grain size. For a 
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summary of performance on all measures analyzed thus far broken down by encoding 
condition, see Table 3. 
Table 3.  Experiment 2 Final Test Performance 
 Retrieval Practice Restudying 
Premise Pairs .81 (.13) .85 (.13) 
Problem Type: 
Anchored .88 (.14) .89 (.18) 
Transitive Inference .64 (.30) .80 (.20) 
TI by Grain Size: 
Coarse-Grained Problems .64 (.35) .84 (.20) 
Fine-Grained Problems .63 (.28) .77 (.23) 
 
Note.  Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) 
 Final Test Performance Broken Down by Test Half.  To mitigate any potential 
concern that the pattern we observed could be have actually been stronger (or 
qualitatively different) at the beginning of the test and then washed out later on, we broke 
down performance by test half.  Similar to Experiment 1, the pattern we found in our 
initial analyses collapsing across all test trials did not differ qualitatively across the test 
halves.  We only found a small (~4%) but significant drop in premise pair memory that 
was the same for both encoding conditions.  The overall advantage in TI we observed in 
the restudying condition was the same across both halves.  Therefore, the nature of the 
restudying advantage we found in our initial analyses was not occluded when aggregating 
across all trials.  For a full report of the analysis, the interested reader is directed to 
Appendix B. 
 Interim Conclusions.  The change in our experimental manipulation proved 
sufficient for inducing a difference between the groups in TI.  Restudying yielded 
superior performance on all TI problems both coarse and fine-grained.  This advantage 
was also in the presence of a non-significant difference in premise pair memory—
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facilitating our interpretation of the difference in TI. Our additional analyses broken 
down by test half also showed that this advantage did not change significantly as the test 
progressed.  Therefore we can conclude that restudying yielded better performance on TI 
problems because the representation it created was significantly more flexible.   
Awareness Questionnaires 
 As in Experiment 1, we also examined TI as a function of awareness.  The same 
awareness scale and criteria used in Experiment 1 were used here.  The same 2 raters 
from Experiment 1 also graded all of the responses.  Both raters were blind to a 
participant’s condition and the scale had good reliability (proportion agreement = .93).  
As done previously, evaluation disagreements were settled through discussion to arrive 
upon a final label of aware or unaware.  A chi-square test revealed that the proportion of 
aware participants was higher in the restudying than retrieval group, χ2 (1) = 4.441, p < 
.05.  Therefore the current design rendered restudying a more effective agent at 
promoting awareness. 
 Before evaluating TI differences as a function of awareness, we needed to assess 
differences in premise pair memory.  If present, they could mediate differences in TI.  A 
2 x 2 (Encoding by Awareness) ANOVA revealed no main effect of encoding (F < 1) and 
no encoding by awareness interaction, F < 1.  We found only a significant main effect of 
awareness, F(1, 50) = 17.603, MSE = .228, p < .001.  Participants deemed aware had 
better premise pair memory than those deemed unaware.  This is consistent with 
Experiment 1 and aligns somewhat with studies that have induced awareness 
experimentally (e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Libben & Titone, 2008).  Controlling for 
awareness, there is still no significant difference in premise pair memory between the 
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encoding conditions, although premise pair memory is better for the aware participants. 
The rates of awareness and a breakdown of premise pair memory are all shown in Table 
4.    
Table 4.  Awareness Rates & Premise Pair Memory 
 
Retrieval Practice Restudying 
Aware 14 19 
Unaware 13 8 
 
  
Aware .88 (.12) .89 (.10) 
Unaware .74 (.10)   .75 (.14) 
 
Note. The upper half of the table displays the raw numbers of participants in each encoding condition who 
were classified as aware and unaware.  The lower half of the panel displays the premise pair memory 
means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for each encoding condition broken down by awareness 
classification. 
 
 We next examined differences in overall TI (regardless of grain size).  A 2 x 2 
(Encoding by Awareness) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of encoding [F(1, 
50) = 5.875, MSE = .299, p < .025] and a significant main effect of awareness [F(1, 50) = 
9.291, MSE = .472, p < .005.].  These main effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction [F(1, 50) = 4.493, MSE = .228, p < .05].  For aware participants, TI did not 
significantly differ as a function of encoding, t < 1.  For unaware participants, however, 
TI was significantly better in the restudying group, t(19) = 2.808, p < .025.  At this 
juncture, it would seem that the restudying group’s advantage is exclusive to the subset of 
participants who were unaware. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 – TI by Awareness 
 
 
 Recall that awareness has been found to modulate grain size effects in TI (Frank 
et al., 2005; Libben & Titone, 2008).  As such we structured our last TI analysis around 
coarse- and fine-grained problems.  A 2 x 2 x 2 (Encoding by Awareness by Grain Size) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of encoding, F(1, 50) = 
5.875, MSE = .597, p < .025.  There was also a significant main effects of awareness 
[F(1, 50) = 9.291, MSE = .945, p < .005] and a marginally significant main effect of grain 
size [F(1, 50) = 3.349, MSE = .069, p = .073].  Grain size did not interact with any 
variables (F’s < 1.66, p’s > .20).  However, as in the previous analysis, we found a 
significant interaction between encoding and awareness, F(1, 50) = 4.493, MSE = .457, p 
< .05. 
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 For aware participants, TI performance for both grain sizes did not significantly 
differ as a function of encoding (both t’s < 1).  For unaware participants in the restudying 
group, there appeared to be an advantage for coarse-grained pairs but this was non-
significant (recall that there was no significant 3-way interaction between encoding, 
awareness, and grain size).  The crucial result was that, for the unaware participants, TI 
was significantly better in the restudying group regardless of grain size—both t(19)’s > 
2.24, p’s < .04.  Performance on TI problems at all levels of analysis is displayed in Table 
5. 
Table 5.  Experiment 2 TI Performance 
 
Retrieval Practice Restudying 
Aware (n = 14) Unaware (n = 13) Aware (n = 19) Unaware (n = 8) 
TI (overall) .80 (.25) .47 (.25) .82 (.20) .76 (.20) 
Coarse-Grained .80 (.32) .48 (.32) .84 (.20) .83 (.19) 
Fine-Grained .80 (.23) .46 (.23) .80 (.22) .69 (.23) 
 
Note.  The rates of awareness for both encoding conditions are displayed below their respective column 
headings.  In addition, performance for overall TI and TI broken down by grain size are displayed in the 
bottom three rows.  Means and standard deviations are shown (in parentheses). 
  
Conclusions 
 As was the case in Experiment 1, it is clear that greater awareness is associated 
with greater premise pair memory and better TI.  There also seems to be no uniform 
effect of grain size in and of itself—but a hint of interaction with encoding and 
awareness.  Most importantly, when one can control for awareness post-hoc, the TI 
advantage associated with restudying changes.   We found that such an advantage is 
evident only when examining unaware participants.  Also—recall that premise pair 
memory was still equal between the encoding conditions when controlling for awareness.  
So the TI advantage for unaware participants in the restudying condition must be due to 
differences in representational flexibility and not overall premise pair memory.  
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Therefore, even when controlling for awareness, there is evidence of unambiguous 
differences in representational flexibility. 
 One potentially lingering concern is over our assessment of awareness.  At first 
glance, it is somewhat puzzling to find that TI for aware participants in the retrieval 
practice group was far superior to the unaware sub-group; meanwhile TI did not 
significantly differ as a function of awareness for those in the restudying group.  Based 
on these results, one might argue that our ability to discern between aware and unaware 
participants was somewhat compromised.  However, we did find that unaware 
participants in the restudying group showed a hint of the grain size effect typically found 
with unaware participants in other studies (e.g., Frank et al., 2005; Libben & Titone, 
2008).  Note that we also found that unaware participants in the retrieval practice group 
exhibited at-chance TI.  They were essentially guessing.  Also note that this pattern 
differs slightly from Experiment 1.  There, we found only a simple main effect of 
awareness (and a marginally significant awareness by grain size interaction).  The aware 
group showed a trend for the typical grain size effects while the unaware group did not; 
they merely showed overall impoverished performance.  Taken together, these results 
convey that we were able to discern between aware and unaware participants.  In fact the 
different profiles across both experiments for the aware and unaware participants of both 
encoding conditions would suggest that we were able to successfully detect degrees of 
awareness. 
General Discussion 
 The current study provides a novel analysis of the effects of testing on abstraction 
and knowledge structure formation. This was due to an amalgam of paradigms from the 
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testing effect and transitive inference literatures.  Unique to this paradigm was the fact 
that it allowed for the creation of a novel knowledge structure whose relationships were 
intrinsic to the materials (i.e., A > B > C, etc.).  Zaromb and Roediger’s (2010) materials 
had intrinsic relationships but they capitalized on pre-existing associations in long-term 
memory.  In regards to Karpicke and Zaromb (2010, Experiment 3):  they tested for serial 
order memory so the associations among the materials were novel, but their subsequent 
importance was not emphasized during encoding.  These properties made serial order 
information of little value during learning.  Conversely, the relational properties of the 
stimuli in the current paradigm were of immense value because realizing them would 
help consolidate one’s representation of the materials. 
 Most importantly, the current paradigm also allowed for the creation of novel 
inference problems.  The paradigms used by Zaromb and Roediger (2010) and by 
Karpicke and Zaromb (2010) did not allow for this.  Other studies of the testing effect 
have examined performance on transfer or inference problems (Butler, 2010; Rohrer et 
al., 2010; Karpicke & Blunt, 2011)—all finding positive effects.  The present 
experiments are the first to find no such effect.  The current paradigm, however, 
permitted control of the grain size or “difficulty” of a problem (where fine-grained and 
coarse-grained problems corresponded to easy and hard problems, respectively) and still 
found no positive effect.  To my knowledge, no other study of the testing effect has 
exhibited such control. 
Recap of Results 
 Across both experiments, there was no test-related enhancement of TI, regardless 
of grain size.  Recall that premise pair memory was also equal between the groups in both 
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experiments.  This was fortuitous in that it permitted interpreting the TI data solely in 
terms of differences in representational flexibility.  In Experiment 1, there was no 
difference in TI.  This was attributed to the strength of the manipulation.  Thus, in 
Experiment 2 one initial learning trial was removed and 3 intervenient ones were added, 
bringing the grand total to 8.  After increasing the number of encoding trials, testing was 
actually found to impede TI.  In addition, controlling for awareness in Experiment 2 
revealed that the negative effect of testing was exclusive to the unaware participants.  
Furthermore, TI was at chance for unaware participants who had engaged in retrieval 
practice.  Their counterparts who had engaged in restudying exhibited TI that was well 
above chance.  The fact that the effects of the encoding manipulations only differed for 
unaware participants is a surprising revelation and it also supports our decision to do a 
post-experiment assessment of awareness.  Most people in fact became aware of the 
hierarchical relational structure of the materials.  TI for aware participants was also well 
above chance and equal for both encoding conditions.  Keep in mind that this still means 
that by all measures, there were no positive effects of testing.  Whether or not the effects 
were negative or null depended on awareness. 
 Interestingly, these results can also be taken to imply that, if the effects of 
awareness are robust, then conditions with low levels of awareness should show strong 
negative testing effects on TI.  More common TI paradigms use hierarchies that are less 
apparent because no dimension (such as value) is overtly provided on which participants 
can rank the stimuli (e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2005; Libben & Titone, 2008; 
Lazareva & Wasserman, 2010).  Under these conditions (ones that require a great deal of 
self-initiated relational processing), awareness rates are quite low.  Based on the results 
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of the current experiments, one would predict that negative testing effects on TI would 
abound under such conditions. 
Theoretical Implications for the Testing Effect 
Item-Order (Item-Relational) Account 
 In the introduction it was mentioned that “unusual” encoding manipulations that 
promote item-specific processing have varying effects in free recall and order 
reconstruction.  In mixed lists where items are subjected to common and unusual 
encoding manipulations (e.g., reading and generation, respectively), overall free recall is 
highest and overall order memory is intermediate:  better than a pure list in the unusual 
condition, and worse than a pure list in the common condition.  In pure lists, where items 
are subjected entirely to a common or unusual manipulation, free recall is usually equal 
between the two encoding conditions but order memory favors the common condition.  In 
fact compared to the mixed list, order memory is usually impaired significantly in the 
pure unusual condition and significantly improved in the pure common condition.  This 
ubiquitous pattern of results has been captured by the item-order account (McDaniel & 
Bugg, 2008).  In the strictest sense, this account is designed to predict performance on 
free recall and order reconstruction tests.  One can, however, extend it to predict the 
effects of an encoding manipulation on item and relational memory, respectively (e.g., 
Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Mulligan & Lozito, 2004). 
 Recent studies have demonstrated that the effects of testing on relational memory 
are not uniform.  Zaromb and Roediger (2010, Experiment 2) found that testing enhanced 
relational memory (as measured by category clustering in free recall).  Karpicke and 
Zaromb (2010, Experiment 3), on the other hand, found that testing disrupted relational 
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memory (as measured by an order reconstruction test).  The aforementioned experiments 
from both studies found an item memory enhancement and used a between-subjects 
design.  Although seemingly paradoxical, both sets of results can be explained by the 
item-order account.  One of the more nuanced tenets of this account is that, in the 
presence of more salient or meaningful relational information (like semantic category 
membership), pure lists of items in the unusual condition will not have a significant 
disruption of relational memory (McDaniel & Bugg, 2008).  Under such conditions, 
relational memory in the unusual condition is spared or even enhanced.  This is because 
salient or more meaningful relational information is easier to notice during encoding and, 
at retrieval, helps one generate candidate targets and/or narrow the search set (McDaniel 
& Bugg, 2008).  Such dynamics might explain the disparity between Zaromb and 
Roediger (2010, Experiment 2) and Karpicke and Zaromb (2010, Experiment 3).  The 
former study used lists of medium frequency nouns from familiar taxonomic categories—
resulting in a familiar, meaningful relational structure to the materials.  Although the 
latter study did use paired associates with familiar relationships (e.g., heart – love), they 
were arranged arbitrarily in unrelated lists—creating an unfamiliar, meaningless 
relational structure.  Thus, one contributor to the disparity between these two studies may 
lie in the familiarity and meaningfulness of their relational structures.  Another 
contributor might also be the way in which the relational information was used to guide 
retrieval during retrieval practice.  Zaromb and Roediger (2010) used free recall during 
retrieval practice.  In free recall, one can use category information as a cue for recall.  
Practice of this strategy also translates well to the final recall test.  In Karpicke and 
Zaromb (2010), retrieval practice was implemented with cued recall of individual items.  
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Therefore, any order information one might have gleaned during encoding could not be 
recapitulated during retrieval practice.  This would also impair one’s ability to reinstate 
item order on the order reconstruction test.  In sum, although the relational structures 
differed between the two studies, this was also conflated with the degree to which one 
could reinstate it during retrieval practice.  Future studies should take this into 
consideration.  Nonetheless, as will be shown later in this section, the nature of the 
relational structure is still a key culprit. 
 The results of the current study are similar to those of Karpicke and Zaromb 
(2010, Experiment 3) in that they show how testing can disrupt relational processing.  
However, because we did not observe an enhancement in premise pair memory, we 
technically cannot conclude that testing enhances item processing at the expense of 
disrupting relational processing.  Instead, the current study revealed conditions under 
which testing will still disrupt relational memory but not enhance item memory.  Similar 
results were found by Mulligan (2002, Experiment 3) for the generation effect when 
using unfamiliar paired associates (e.g., tomato - cake).  Under these conditions, he found 
that generation yielded a negative effect on order memory and no effect on item memory.   
 Mulligan (2002), however, found null item and negative order memory effects 
when encoding was manipulated within subjects—we manipulated encoding between 
subjects.  Because the testing effect is reduced in a between-subjects design (Roediger & 
Karpicke, 2006b, Experiment 2; Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010, Experiment 3), it is possible 
that using stimuli with unfamiliar associations within a between-subjects design induces a 
null effect on item memory while maintaining the relational memory disruption.  Recall, 
however, that Roediger and Karpicke (2006b) and Karpicke and Zaromb (2010) used 
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materials covering several familiar concepts and associations in long-term memory.  
Therefore, it appears that, under a between subjects design, it is possible to get a null 
testing effect on item memory, but only when using materials with unfamiliar intra-item 
associations.  Future studies of the testing effect could experimentally manipulate the 
familiarity of the intra-item associations in a manner similar to Mulligan (2002, 
Experiment 3) to see if this is indeed the case. 
Effects of Interference 
 It has been shown that testing can mitigate the effects of proactive inference 
across lists of semantically categorized words (Szpunar et al., 2008; Zaromb & Roediger, 
2010).  However, recall that in a double-function list-learning paradigm, Slamecka (1976) 
found evidence that testing might exacerbate interference within a list. Given that our 
paradigm is similar to double-function list learning, one might expect interference to be 
abound—therefore making testing a less optimal learning strategy.  Specifically, 
Slamecka (1976) found that retrieval-based learning promoted interference from near and 
remote associates in both forward and backward directions.  If similar mechanisms were 
operating in our paradigm, one would expect performance to be relatively worse in the 
retrieval practice group for the premise pair with the most remote associates in both 
directions.  This would be the DE pair.  Element D rests in the center of the hierarchy and 
thus has the most potential for interference.  In a post-hoc analysis for Experiment 2, we 
in fact found significantly worse performance on this pair, compared to the restudying 
group, t(52) = 2.615, p < .025. 
 It would appear that testing does not always mitigate the effects of interference.  
The deleterious effects that testing exerts on hierarchy abstraction seem similar to those it 
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exerts on double-function list learning (e.g., Slamecka, 1976).  However, to test this 
conclusively, one would have to examine response production errors in an open-ended 
manner.  Slamecka (1976) concluded that testing generates more interference only 
because the testing subjects were more likely to produce within-list intrusion errors from 
near and remote associates to a given cue.  Our paradigm only involved a 2AFC test so 
we could not examine intrusion errors in a more open-ended manner.  However, the 
accuracy data on the DE pair strongly suggest that interference was higher in the retrieval 
practice group. 
Role of Elaborative Rehearsal 
 The primary question posed by our results is why, for unaware participants, did 
the restudying group perform better on the TI problems even when overall premise pair 
memory was equal?  I have provided suggestive evidence that restudying yields less 
within-list interference than retrieval practice.  I have also asserted that the current results 
support the notion that restudying in general allows more room for relational processing 
than “unusual” encoding strategies (i.e., the item-order account, McDaniel & Bugg, 
2008).  That is, because restudying does not place as much emphasis on item-level 
information as other encoding strategies, it provides more opportunities to take notice of 
the relationships among the items.  This is a form of elaborative rehearsal.  It is possible 
that the luxury of elaborative rehearsal was less accessible in the retrieval practice 
condition because more time was spent on local, premise-based learning.  Recall that, 
during the intervenient phase, participants had 5 sec to devote to recall and were given 
2.5 sec for feedback.  Because the majority of the trial time was dedicated to retrieving an 
isolated cue-target association (i.e., item-level information), participants had little time to 
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engage in elaborative rehearsal.  If this is indeed the case, then retrieval practice should 
yield worse performance than any strategy that promotes elaborative rehearsal.   
 Surprisingly, a recent study by Karpicke and Blunt (2011, Experiment 1) found 
that retrieval practice yielded better memory than restudying or concept mapping—all the 
while using a between-subjects design.  Concept mapping is when one takes the 
information contained in a text and then rewrites it as a series of nodes and links that 
convey the overall, abridged idea structure of the passage.  This is obviously an active, 
elaborative encoding strategy.  It is therefore all the more surprising that retrieval practice 
yielded better performance.  There are several differences between their study and the 
current one (e.g., their memoranda were scientific text passages and their retention 
interval was 1 week).  However, one crucial difference was how they operationalized 
retrieval practice.  In this condition, participants read a passage for 5 minutes and then 
took a free recall test lasting 10 minutes.  Afterwards, they actually re-read the passage 
for another 5 minutes and then engaged in another 10 minutes of free recall.  This 
additional re-reading period is probably a key factor.  It likely yielded at least two 
benefits:  1) it provided corrective feedback and 2) it gave more room for elaborative 
rehearsal.  Although the present study provided feedback, it was intermixed with retrieval 
practice on a trial-by-trial basis—which is a very different experience than a protracted 
period of restudying.  Perhaps retrieval practice intermixed with protracted restudying 
periods is a more optimal learning schedule—possibly because of the supplementary 
elaborative rehearsal.  If such rehearsal was a driving factor in our study, future studies 
could experimentally manipulate the level of elaborative rehearsal to see if this makes 
one group’s performance mimic the other.  One could supplement retrieval practice with 
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the appropriate amount of restudying time to see if this yields TI behavior similar to that 
produced by pure restudying. 
Transfer, Abstraction, Flexibility, & Inference  
 One of the most important contributions of the current study was that it 
disambiguated the effects of testing on abstraction and representational flexibility.  Recall 
that this is different than the effects of testing on the transfer of knowledge.  Abstraction 
involves deriving the relational structure of the memoranda from its basic premises.  
Representational flexibility describes the ease with which one can recombine parts of a 
knowledge structure in a way that was not overtly taught to them.  Transfer, on the other 
hand, involves realizing that information learned in one domain is applicable to a 
different domain, and then applying that information successfully.  
 As mentioned in the introduction, Butler (2010) demonstrated that, compared to 
restudying, testing can facilitate transfer.  However, recall that the retrieval practice 
condition used factual and conceptual questions to test the participants’ knowledge of the 
passages, and that the answers to these questions were reinforced via feedback.  This 
likely promoted stimulus-response learning—obscuring the effects of testing on 
abstraction of the concepts.  Also the transfer tests did not require participants to 
recombine previously learned facts and concepts.  Therefore, although Butler’s (2010) 
study was meritorious in many respects, it did not examine the effects of testing on 
abstraction and representational flexibility.  Rohrer et al.’s (2010) study of test-enhanced 
transfer likewise did not clarify the effects of testing on abstraction and representational 
flexibility.  Recall that Rohrer et al. (2010) required participants to learn locations on a 
map.  On the transfer test, participants were asked “When traveling from [X town] to [Z 
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town], which town would you pass through?”  This paradigm provided a better 
examination of abstraction and flexibility than Butler (2010).  However, the effects of 
testing on those two properties were still unclear in Rohrer et al. (2010) because the 
participants were provided with a map on the transfer test, minus the town names.  
Therefore, Rohrer et al. could not examine the effects of testing when one must act 
entirely on his or her own abstracted, internal representation.  The current study, 
however, did not provide any such aide on the final test and therefore could 
unambiguously examine the effects of testing on an abstracted, internal representation.  
Under our conditions, these effects turned out to be null for aware participants and 
negative for unaware participants. 
 The results of Karpicke and Blunt (2011) present a more puzzling case.  Recall 
that, in their first experiment, they too manipulated encoding between subjects.  They 
also found that testing enhanced performance on inference problems.  While this is a 
demonstration of test-enhanced inference, it is unclear as to whether or not this reflects 
the same kind of flexibility and abstraction required in the current study.  The following 
example provided from their study suggests that the flexibility they observed may be 
more local.   
 In their first experiment, participants studied a passage about sea otters taken from 
a preparatory guide for the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL; cf. Rogers, 
2001).  The final test contained 14 verbatim questions and 2 inference questions.  An 
example of an inference question and an acceptable answer is as follows:   
Q:  “What would be the consequences of removing sea otters from their environment?”  A:  
“There would be a lack of protection of kelp and seaweed, because fewer otters would eat the 
invertebrates that destroy kelp and seaweed.  The presence of more invertebrates would change the 
ecosystem.” 
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It should also be known that most of the necessary information for the answer could be 
gleaned from part of the original passage: 
“Sea otters play an important environmental role by protecting forests of seaweed called kelp, 
which provide shelter and nutrients to many species. Certain sea otters feast on invertebrates, like 
sea urchins and abalones, that destroy kelp.” (Rogers, 2001). 
 
It would appear that answering the above inference question successfully requires some 
degree of flexibility.  However, it is not clear if this represents the same scale of 
flexibility and abstraction required in our paradigm.  Because the inference in question 
was based on a few facts gleaned directly from one part of the passage, one could argue 
that the requisite flexibility is more local than global.  In addition there are other critical 
differences between their study and ours:  Karpicke and Blunt (2011) had supplemental 
elaborative rehearsal, used materials with more familiar associations, had fewer inference 
problems, and used a longer retention interval.   As stated before, I believe that the 
supplemental elaborative rehearsal played a unique role in their study and that the 
familiarity of the materials played a role in their study and similar ones. 
Potential Criticisms of Our Design 
 Like other encoding manipulations that emphasize item-specific processing, the 
benefits of testing are largest in a within-subjects design (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b; 
Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010).  One might therefore argue that our between-subjects design 
put the retrieval practice group at a systematic disadvantage.  While such a design will 
compress the size of the testing effect, recall that other studies have found the effect in a 
between-subjects design (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b, Experiment 2; Karpicke & 
Zaromb, 2010, Experiment 3) and have even asserted that this is a quality on which the 
testing effect differs from the generation effect (Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010).  In sum, the 
use of a between-subjects design alone could not have eliminated the positive effects of 
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testing.  Implementing a within-subjects manipulation in a TI paradigm would also be 
problematic.  It would have been difficult to subject one half of the premises to 
restudying and the other to retrieval practice without raising the potential of cross-
condition contamination.  
 Another concern might be the demands of our retrieval manipulation.  It has often 
been found that the testing effect is most pronounced when the intervenient test requires 
more self-initiated processing.  Recall that Glover (1989) found that, compared to 
recognition or cued recall, an intervenient free recall test produced the largest testing 
effect—regardless of whether the final test was recognition, cued recall, or free recall.  
Based on Glover’s (1989) results, one might argue that our design imposed another 
systematic disadvantage because the intervenient test was only 2AFC.  Under normal 
circumstances, 2AFC recognition would require less self-initiated processing than free 
recall.  However, the current paradigm was not 2AFC recognition because it did not 
require forced judgments over one old and one new item.  The present 2AFC test requires 
more self-initiated processing than 2AFC recognition.  The majority of the elements in 
the current paradigm had variable reinforcement histories.  For the internal pairs, half the 
time a given painting was the right answer and half the time it was the wrong one.  
Successfully recalling the correct answer requires a substantial amount of interference 
control—which presumably requires a great deal of self-initiated processing.  Therefore, 
it seems unlikely that our retrieval practice manipulation placed insufficient demands on 
self-initiated processing.  Rather it would seem that the nature of the interference at hand, 
the between-subjects design, the relational structure of the materials, and the lacking 
familiarity for their associations contributed to the present results. 
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 Finally, one might wonder if our design had too many encoding trials, resulting in 
over-learning in both groups and thus perverting the potential differences between them.  
However, Zaromb and Roediger (2010) had many encoding trials in their first experiment 
and found that testing did not increase objective organization (i.e., category clustering) 
but did increase subjective organization (i.e., pair frequency).  If the number of trials in 
itself were a key factor, then there should have been no differences between the groups 
because our materials required more objective organizational memory4.  To the contrary, 
it was abundantly clear in Experiment 2 that the testing group was impoverished on the 
TI problems (at least in the unaware group).  Furthermore, the testing group received 
feedback on a trial-by-trial basis during the intervenient phase.  This should have given 
them the opportunity to engage in a great deal of corrective learning.  In spite of this, 
there was still no advantage in relational memory as indexed by TI.  If anything, 
Experiment 2 showed that the number of encoding trials in the first one was insufficient 
for revealing potential group differences.  
Necessary Qualifiers 
 One must also keep in mind that the negative effects observed in the current study 
are thus far restricted to an immediate test.  The null effect or disadvantage of testing 
often fades within 1 or 2 days after initial learning (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b; 
Carpenter et al., 2008).  Therefore we should expect no benefit of restudying at longer 
retention intervals.  The longer retention interval in Karpicke and Blunt (2011) might also 
explain why they observed a moderate, but significant advantage on their inference 
                                                 
4
 Zaromb and Roediger’s (2010) first experiment also manipulated encoding within subjects.  Nonetheless, 
the present results show that the number of encoding trials is not a key factor in and of itself. 
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problems5.  A natural follow-up to the current study would be to examine performance at 
a longer retention interval. 
Generalizing To Broader Aspects of Learning 
 In sum, the current results suggest that when one is learning a novel, highly inter-
related knowledge structure, testing is less effective than restudying.  The present design 
mimics conditions under which a knowledge structure is in its infancy and there is little 
support from pre-existing knowledge.  There may be a point in the course of learning at 
which testing may enhance long-term retention, but the present results suggest this does 
not occur at the initial stages. 
Educational Implications 
 The results of the retrieval practice condition demonstrated the potential 
deleterious effects of excessive premise-based learning.  More specifically, an over 
emphasis on stimulus-response based learning actually lead to representational 
inflexibility.  Problems such as this probably explain why effective second language 
learning is often supplemented with immersion exercises that promote flexibility (not just 
stimulus-response learning). 
 For example, when learning a language, it helps to learn the basic vocabulary and 
rules of syntax but, if one is to effectively make use of that knowledge and engage in 
active conversation, one must also practice recombining the basic elements of vocabulary 
and syntax—possibly in the form of practice compositions or elementary conversational 
exchanges that tax one’s knowledge in a novel way.  This approach provides the 
                                                 
5
 No exact mean difference was reported because, when verbatim and inference questions were analyzed, 
there were only main effects of encoding and question type.  Retrieval practice was overall better than 
restudying and verbatim questions were easier than inference questions.  Visual inspection reveals that the 
difference on inferential questions was on the order of 11% (restudying: M ~ .58; retrieval practice: M ~ 
.69).   
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opportunity to find new navigational routes of a knowledge structure that one would not 
otherwise discover during stimulus-response learning.  This in effect might render the 
representation more flexible and thus facilitate solutions to future (linguistic) problems. 
Conclusions 
 Testing has often been shown to produce remarkable effects on memory retention.  
The net result of these effects is usually positive—lending further support to its 
educational utility.  However, several recent studies have shown that its effects on 
various aspects of memory are not uniformly positive.  While testing often enhances item 
information, its effects on relational information are more complex.  The current study 
revealed conditions under which testing will impair relational memory and have no effect 
on item memory.  The results also suggest that the nature in which knowledge must be 
recombined is another key determinant of the effects of testing on relational memory.  
The present study, in combination with other recent ones, also suggests that the 
familiarity of the to-be-learned associations might be a key determinant of the positive 
effects of testing on item memory.  Advocates of the educational utility of testing should 
carefully consider the potential systemic effects of testing (and possibly the nature of the 
materials) before deciding to implement additional memory tests.  This can have a 
tremendous impact on the marginal returns of testing. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Awareness Questionnaire (adapted from Frank et al., 2005) 
1. Do you have any prior knowledge of the paintings used in the experiment? 
2. If you answered “Yes” to question 1, please indicate to what extent you are familiar 
with these paintings. 
3. Did you have the impression that some of the pairs were easier to learn than others? 
4. Did you think any of the paintings were ALWAYS the most valuable (no matter what 
the other painting was)? 
5. Did you think any of the paintings were ALWAYS the least valuable (no matter what 
the other painting was)? 
6. Did you have the impression that there was some kind of logical rule, order, or 
hierarchy of the paintings in the experiment? If so, please explain briefly. 
7. In the test phase, were there any new paintings? 
8. Where there any new combinations of paintings? 
9. If you answered “Yes” to question 8, how did you make your choice in these cases? 
(e.g., guessed, went with instinct, used some sort of rule—explain) 
Appendix B 
Experiment 1 Test-Half Analyses 
 For premise pair memory, a 2 x 2 (Encoding by Test Half) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of encoding (F < 1), nor a significant 
encoding by test half interaction, F (1, 52) = 1.009, MSE = .006, p = .32.  There was, 
however, a significant main effect of test half, F (1, 52) = 5.809, MSE = .037, p < .025: 
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premise pair memory was better in the first half of the test (M = .83, SD = .14) than in the 
second half (M = .79, SD = .16). This could be due increasing interference or 
“unlearning” from probing the memory trace multiple times and from multiple directions 
of association.  Additionally, simple forgetting might occur over time because the test 
trials do not provide feedback.  However, most importantly, the rate of decline did not 
differ between the encoding conditions and the non-significant difference in premise pair 
memory we observed did not change over test blocks. 
 We then analyzed anchored and TI problems across the test.  A 2 x 2 x 2 
(Encoding by Test Half by Problem Type) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no main 
effect of encoding or test half (both F’s < 1).  However, like before, there was a 
significant main effect of problem type, F (1, 52) = 31.375, MSE = .826, p < .001.  For 
both halves of the test, performance on anchored pairs was better than that for TI pairs 
[both t(53)’s > 4.8, both p’s < .001].  There were no significant 2-way interactions (all 
F’s < 1.33, all p’s > .25).  We did, however, observe a marginally significant 3-way 
interaction between encoding, problem type, and test half, F (1, 52) = 3.837, MSE = .026, 
p = .056.  Pair-wise tests revealed that the change in the difference between anchored and 
TI pairs across the test halves differed between the two encoding conditions.  In the 
retrieval practice condition, the difference appeared to shrink because it was significant in 
the first half [t(26) = 3.287, p < .005] but only marginally significant in the second half 
[t(26) = 2.359, p = .026].  For the restudy condition, however, the difference was 
significant in both the first [t(26) = 3.947, p < .005] and second halves [t(26) = 4.451, p < 
.001].  Critically, however, there were no differences in TI between the groups across the 
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test.  So, while there were minute changes across the test within groups, this did not 
qualitatively affect the general pattern of non-significant differences between groups. 
Experiment 2 Test-Half Analyses 
 We first examined premise pair memory.  A 2 x 2 (Encoding by Test Half) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of encoding [F(1, 52) = 
1.008, MSE = .034, p = .32.] and no significant encoding by test half interaction, F < 1.  
We only observed a significant main effect of test half, F(1, 52) = 17.695, MSE = .062, p 
< .001.  As in Experiment 1, for both groups, premise pair memory was better in the first 
half. 
 Next we examined performance on the non-adjacent pairs (the anchored and TI 
problems).  A 2 x 2 x 2 (Encoding by Problem Type by Test Half) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed the same pattern of results we found in our initial analyses.  Critically, 
however, there was no main effect of test half, F < 1.  Although we did find a main effect 
of problem type, F(1, 52) = 22.975, MSE = 1.413, p < .001.  Anchored pairs were easier 
to solve than TI pairs.  There was also a marginally significant main effect of encoding, 
F(1, 52) = 3.268, MSE = .387, p = .076.  We also observed the critical interaction 
between encoding and problem type, F(1, 52) = 5.261, MSE = .324, p < .05.  As in the 
first wave of analyses, performance was equal on the anchored pairs (first and second 
blocks: t’s < 1) but TI was superior in the restudying group (first and second blocks: both 
t(52)’s > 2.28, p’s < .03).  There were no other significant interactions (all F’s < 1). 
 Since the effect of test half was non-significant and we observed the same 
interaction found in the prior analyses, we can conclude that the change in the restudy 
condition’s advantage on the TI pairs was not significantly different in the second half.   
67 
 
 
 To see if the restudying group’s TI advantage on the test might have changed by 
grain size, we also analyzed performance on the coarse- and fine-grained pairs across test 
halves.  A 2 x 2 x 2 (Encoding by Test Half by Grain Size) repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed a pattern of results very similar to that of our initial analyses.  Like before there 
was no main effect of grain size, F(1, 52) = 2.278, MSE = .094, p = .137. We also 
observed a significant main effect of encoding, F(1, 52) = 5.572, MSE = 1.418, p < .025.  
Critically, there was no main effect of test half, F < 1.  There was a marginally significant 
3-way interaction, F(1, 52) = 3.214, MSE = .046, p = .079. No other interactions 
approached significance (all F’s < 1). 
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 Although these results suggest a bit more nuance than previously thought, the 
significant main effect of encoding is consistent with our prior analysis in which we 
collapsed across test halves.  Most importantly, encoding did not interact with test half—
showing that the restudying condition’s advantage for both grain-sizes did not 
significantly change over test halves.  The marginally significant 3-way interaction might 
be indicative of minute changes in the restudying condition’s advantage.  In any case, the 
interaction is non-significant and therefore only suggestive.  As such the most 
parsimonious conclusion is that restudying yields TI advantages for both grain sizes—
regardless of test half. 
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 As in our primary analyses, we also broke down the test half by TI grain size.  A 2 
x 2 x 2 (Encoding by Grain Size by Test Half) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no 
main effect of encoding or test half (both F’s < 1).  There was a marginally significant 
main effect of grain size, F (1, 52) = 3.847, MSE = .14, p = .055.  As in the prior analysis, 
coarse-grained problems were somewhat easier to solve than fine-grained ones.  There 
was no significant interaction between encoding and test half, F (1, 52) = 1.658, MSE = 
.029, p = .204.  No other interactions were significant either (all F’s < 1).  These results 
show that, across the test, TI did not differ between groups.  This pattern extended to both 
grain sizes.  In sum, the pattern of non-significance we observed in our initial analyses 
was not due to an initial effect washing out across the test halves. 
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